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Abstract A low interest rate regime remains in place in the U.S. after the Financial
Crisis of 2008. Banks nevertheless need to find ways to boost the economic value to
shareholders. This research examine whether it is possible for banks to stay the course
and pursue profitable yet riskier assets or investments regardless of the fact that
regulators have put restrictions on banks’ asset portfolio formation and capital ratio.
This study hypothesizes that banks still engage in highly risky yet profitable investments or services to offset low interest income even after the 2008 Financial Crisis. A
panel VAR model and a dynamic GMM model incorporating two structural breaks are
employed to examine bank data obtained from the FFIEC from 2003 thru 2014. This
study suggests that banks, especially larger banks, still have strong incentives to
undertake riskier projects with higher expected returns in order to increase their
performance. This has implications for policy makers examining risks inherent to the
banking system.
Keywords 2008 financial crisis . Bank profitability . Interest rates . Off-balance-sheet
activities . Panel VAR . GMM . Multiple structural breaks
JEL Classification G21 . E44

1 Introduction and literature review
During a lengthy period (i.e. 2008–2014) of low interest rates, the primary venue for
banks to generate revenues, the traditional loan business becomes less profitable.
Therefore, banks as any other corporation have to find alternatives to maintain acceptable level of returns in order to satisfy their clients and stakeholders.
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Since a low interest rate regime remains in place in the U.S. after the Financial Crisis
of 2008 and banks nevertheless need to find ways to boost the economic value of the
shareholders, would it be possible for banks to stay the same course and pursue risky
assets or investments regardless of the fact that regulators imposed restrictions on banks
asset portfolio formation during and after the Financial Crisis? The data in Fig. 1
suggest this possibility. Therefore, we hypothesize that banks still engage in both highly
risky yet profitable investments and services even after the Financial Crisis of 2008
while the interest rate remains low. We suspect that banks still have strong incentives to
undertake profitable yet riskier activities and investments in order to improve their
performance (Fahlenbrach et al. 2012). Duchin and Sosyura (2014) analyze TARP
banks and non-TARP banks and show that TARP banks shifted credit originations to
higher risk yet profitable loans after they received financial aid from the government.
This research examines publicly available bank data to see if banks seek higher yield by
providing fee-based services such as loan commitments, credit substitutes, and other
services such as trusts.
Stiroh (2006a, b) use publicly traded U.S. bank-holding company data to examine
the determinants of risk and analyze how they have evolved. Using the standard

(A) Pattern of GDP growth from 2003q1 through 2014q3
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(B) Pattern of 10-year Treasury bond interest rate from 2003q1 through 2014q3

2

3

4

5

nominal 10-year T-bond rate from 2003q1 through 2014q3

01jan2002

01jan2004

01jan2006

01jan2008

01jan2010

01jan2012

01jan2014

time

Fig. 1 Pattern of macroeconomic and bank level variables from 200q1 through 2014q3. A. Pattern of GDP
growth from 2003q1 through 2014q3 B. Pattern of 10-year Treasury bond interest rate from 2003q1 through
2014q3 C. Pattern of on-balance-sheet activities for different sizes from 2003q1 through 2014q3 D. Pattern of
off-balance-sheet activities for different sizes of banks from 2003q1 through 2014q3 E. Pattern of return on
assets for different sizes of banks from 2003q1 through 2014q3
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(C) Pattern of on-balance-sheet activities for different sizes from 2003q1 through 2014q3
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(D) Pattern of off-balance-sheet activities for different sizes of banks from 2003q1 through 2014q3
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(E) Pattern of return on assets for different sizes of banks from 2003q1 through 2014q3
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Fig. 1 (continued)

deviation of equity return as the proxy for risk, the results show that balance sheet
activities, such as commercial and industrial loans and consumer lending, as well
as income statement items, such as other noninterest income, drive the crosssectional differences in bank holding company risks. Sources of risk have changed
since banks shifted their business model from deposit-driven activities to feebased activities after 2001. The results also indicate that income statement activities (items) become more important than balance sheet items as determinants of
risk. In particular, the non-interest income and expense items generated by fee-
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based activities, i.e. off-balance-sheet activities, have drawn more attention by the
banking community in the last decade.
Several papers have discussed the impact of off-balance-sheet activities on bank
performance and different kinds of risks, including systemic risk, total risk, and market
risk. An early study by Allen and Jagtiani (2000) finds that the benefit of diversification
by expanding bank business into nontraditional business might not be large enough to
offset the increase in systemic risk and market risk. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) use U.S.
financial holding companies to examine whether engaging in more off-balance-sheet
activities helps bank diversify risk. Their results indicate that the benefit of diversification has been diminished and offset by more risk exposure to unstable noninterest
earnings generated by those fee-based activities. Calmés and Théoret (2010) use an
ARCH-M model to examine Canadian bank data and confirm that noninterest income
generated by off-balance-sheet activities no longer impacts bank returns positively. It
turns out the surge in off-balance-sheet activities eventually increases bank risk.
DeYoung and Torna (2013) analyze the relationship between bank failure and noninterest income activities. They further decompose noninterest income businesses into
nontraditional stakeholder activities, fee for services activities, and traditional banking
activities such as depositor services and fiduciary services. Their analysis suggests the
likelihood of bank failure is much higher for already financially distressed banks
engage in stakeholder activities such as underwriting, investment banking, venture
capital and other investments that may require banks to hold risky assets.
On the other hand, Ziadeh-Mikati (2012) uses U.S. commercial bank data to
examine the impact of off-balance-sheet activities on bank failure and risk exposure. Their study specifically separates off-balance-sheet activities into three
different categories including credit substitutes, credit derivatives and derivative
contracts. The results show that banks engaging in more credit substitutes have a
lower degree of volatility on return on assets (ROA), higher quality of assets, and
lower credit risks.1 A recent study by Papanikolaou and Wolff (2014) documents
the impact of off-balance-sheet activities as part of the risk-weighted capital ratio
on overall banking risk. According to their finding, off-balance-sheet leverage is
negatively linked to the soundness of the banking system as a whole before and
after the Financial Crisis of 2008.
Although early literature documents inconclusive results on whether off-balance
sheet activities (fee-based activities) increase or reduce bank risk, recent studies show a
positive relationship between off-balance-sheet activities and bank risk. Furthermore,
most studies conduct a unidirectional test, that is, they assume off-balance sheet activity
is an exogenous factor to be included in the regression model. This treatment of offbalance sheet activity ignores the fact that sometimes banks use off-balance sheet
activities (or services-based activities) to enhance or improve bank profitability when
focusing on loan originations or other on-balance-sheet activities that do not adequately
increase bank profit. That is, the motivation to increase off-balance-sheet activities
could be partly due to falling revenues on interest-bearing assets over a period during
which interest rates first fall and later are stable but at a very low level.

1

The paper uses the ratio of non-performing loans, the ratio of loan loss reserves and loan loss provision to
measure banks’ credit risk.
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We take a different approach to allow a contemporaneous relationship between offbalance sheet activities, which are the primary sources of non-interest income, and
interest rates while accounting for other relevant bank variables. We argue that the
primary consideration for a bank to engage in more off-balance-sheet activities depends
on economic conditions that affect the ability of a bank to generate revenues. During an
economic boom, a bank is more than willing to make loans to individuals and
businesses in anticipation of low default risks and higher payoffs. However, during a
slow economy, firms reduce investment at the same time that banks require stricter
credit standards (Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010). Banks also find themselves scaling
down the amount of new loans. Furthermore, it might be more costly for banks to make
loans, for example if the cost of taking deposits is not recovered when interest rates are
being held low by the monetary authority.
The most closely related prior study is Delis and Kouretas (2011). They conclude
that lower interest rates are associated with increasing risk-taking behavior using
European bank data. Their paper also suggests that the impact of lower interest rate
on holdings of riskier assets was diminished for banks with higher equity capital and
amplified for banks with higher off-balance-sheet items. One possible reason is that
banks have to develop business other than traditional banking activities in order to
generate extra revenues to satisfy their shareholders. Under this scenario, banks
naturally engage in more services-based activities such as providing standby credits,
letters of credit, loan commitments and financial derivative contracts that are not for
hedging purposes.
Our main research interest centers on the investigation of the relationship between
off-balance sheet activities and interest rates and the impulse response relationship
among all dependent variables. Our paper differs in two important ways from Delis and
Kouretas (2011). First of all, we use risk-weighted off-balance-sheet items and riskweighted on-balance-sheet items as proxies for bank risk-taking behavior.2 Secondly,
our model addresses endogeneity by using Panel VAR in addition to the Dynamic
GMM model for panel data used in their paper.
Delis and Kouretas (2011) address the issue of the dynamic nature of bank risktaking and how the potential endogeneity of some of the control variables may affect
the results by using a dynamic GMM model for panel data (Arellano and Bond
(1991); Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998)). Following a
similar methodology in the first part of the paper, the results of our model are
remarkably similar results to theirs. Specifically, we find that both bank size and
10-year bond rates have a significant and negative relationship with bank risk
behavior while economic growth frequently shows a positive relationship with
bank risk behavior.
2

The risk-weighted off-balance-sheet assets including financial derivatives and other off-balance-sheet assets
are calculated based on 0 %, 20 %, 50 % and 100 % conversion factors regulated by the two-step approach of
the regulatory capital rule. For instance, unused commitments with an original maturity of one year or less are
in the 0 % credit conversion factor group; a commercial letter of credit is in the 20 % credit conversion factor
group; unused portions of commitments, including home equity lines of credit, with an original maturity
exceeding one year or that are unconditionally cancellable are in the 50 % credit conversion factor group;
guarantees or financial guarantee-type standby letters of credit, recourse obligations and direct credit substitutes, and forward agreements with a certain drawdown are in the 100 % credit conversion factor group. A
financial institution must determine the credit equivalent amount of its off-balance sheet financial derivative
contracts that are not subject to qualifying bilateral netting contracts.
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However, a dynamic GMM model for panel data does not fully consider
endogeneity of some of the control variables such as off-balance-sheet items, onbalance-sheet items, interest rates, and economic growth. Our paper addresses this
issue by employing a Panel Vector Autoregression (Panel VAR) model. This model
allows us to take advantage of the rich information embedded in the cross-sectional and
time-series data while examining the interaction among the included endogenous
variables.
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) investigate bank lending behavior and suggests that
a possible reason that the rise in commercial and industrial loans during the Financial
Crisis of 2008 (documented by Chari et al. 2008) is partly due to an increase in the
drawdown of revolving credit facilities. Therefore, an increase in on-balance-sheet
items in this period may be caused by a decrease in off-balance-sheet items in the
previous quarter. That is, risk has transferred from off-balance-sheet activities to onbalance-sheet activities and accordingly affects bank profitability. Hence, we find it
proper to separate bank risk-taking behavior into on-balance-sheet risk taking and offbalance-sheet risk taking and examine how they simultaneously interact with lower
interest rates during different economic conditions.
Using a dynamic model for panel data, our empirical results strongly suggest that
banks, on average, engage in more off-balance-sheet activities during a period of falling
interest rates when controlling for economic conditions and other bank level variables.
The results obtained by the Panel VAR model are similar in that off-balance-sheet
activities negatively respond to a change in lagged 10-year T-bond rate between
2008q2 and 2010q4, suggesting banks increase their off-balance-sheet activities in
response to falling interest rates. The negative impact is persistent for more than 12
quarters. We further break down all banks into four different groups by total assets and
examine how each group responses to falling interest rates. On one hand, larger banks
from Groups 2, 3 and 4 respond negatively to falling interest rates subsequently and
remain in negative territory for more than 12 quarters. On the other hand, the smallest
banks that form Group 1 have almost no response to falling interest rates contemporaneously and subsequently. The different response suggests that larger banks are able
to act more quickly in response to a less hospitable business environment than smaller
banks. Yet larger banks also have higher risks since 2008 when businesses have faced
considerable economic uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
econometric model. We discuss the rationale behind the model specification and
possible limitations of the model associated with the nature of the banking data.
Section 3 presents empirical results and provides a discussion of insights from
the results. Section 4 discusses some relevant policy implications and concludes
the paper.

2 Data and model specification
2.1 Data
Bank level data is retrieved from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC). We obtained Uniform Bank Performance reports (UBPR) dated from
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2003q1 through 2014q3 for all American banks from the FFIEC website. This report
contains annual and quarterly financial and accounting information for domestic banks.
The GDP growth rate and the 10-year T-bond rate are obtained from the FRED
database of the Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis. We apply several filters to the bank
data. First of all, we exclude trust banks that do not have traditional bank businesses
such as loans and deposits. Banks with negative net interest income and negative total
shareholders’ equity are also deleted from the sample. Banks with return on equity
above 100 % are deleted as we find an extremely high return on equity is caused by
near-zero total shareholder’s equity. Then we manually identify data points that are
extreme that are likely due to acquisition and/or merger. Lastly, we exclude banks with
less than 3 years of financial data. With all of these filters in place, the resulting data set
has 279,884 total observations from 7509 banks. All banks are grouped into one of the
four size classes based on total assets of $10 million or less, between $10 million and
$1 billion, between $1 billion and $10 billion, and above 10 billion, and are denoted
Group 1–4 respectively.
Table 1 provides a descriptive summary for major variables in the Panel VAR model.
Panel A of Table 1 presents bank-level variables that are differenced into logtransformed values. For instance, the average growth rate on net interest income is
4.22 % with a high standard deviation of 80.60 %. One point worth noting is that offbalance-sheet activities outgrew on-balance-sheet activities over the past decade. Delis
and Kouretas (2011) also concluded that banks held riskier assets before the onset of
the Financial Crisis of 2008. One should pay attention to the within and between
variations of the data. Apparently variation is higher over time than across banks
suggesting the time effect might have strong explanatory power when compared to
differences across banks. Panel B of Table 1 presents a descriptive summary for two
macroeconomic variables, the nominal GDP growth rate and the 10-year T-bond rate, in
three different sub-periods.
Figure 1 presents the trend on the GDP growth rate, the 10-year T-bond rate,
the growth rate of on-balance-sheet activities and the growth rate of offbalance-sheet activities. As shown in Panel A, the U.S. economy experienced
negative growth from 2008q3 thru 2009q2. Meanwhile, Panel B of Fig. 1
shows that the 10-year T-bond rate started to fall as the Federal Reserve Bank
used several monetary measures to bring down long-term rates. The 10-year Tbond reached its lowest level in 2012q2 and slowly climbed afterward. A
statistical summary of the two macroeconomic variables is presented in Panel
B of Table 1. Two possible major structural breaks are observed in the 10year T-bond rate series. One can conclude that, while the economy has experienced a notable contraction and two expansions during this period with the
GDP growth rate exhibiting a V-shaped pattern, the 10-year T-bond rate has an
overall downward trend as the average T-bond rate declines from 4.389 % to
2.374 % over the same period.
Panels C and D of Fig. 1 show the patterns of the growth rate on both risk-weighted onbalance-sheet and risk-weighted off-balance-sheet activities by total asset size groups. All
banks had a similar growth pattern before 2008. However, the largest banks (Group 4)
saw significant declines in on-balance-sheet-activities right after 2008q1, and clearly
indicate that largest banks suffered greatly at the beginning of the Financial Crisis of
2008. This group also had a quick increase in on-balance-sheet activities after 2010. In
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Table 1 Summary statistics for main level variables in GMM and Panel VAR model
Panel A: Bank level variables
Variable
tenetintinc

nonintinc

Overall

Mean (%)

Standard deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Observations

4.22

80.60

-672.56

585.92

N = 279,884

Between

3.85

-18.64

55.74

n = 7509

Within

80.54

-667.33

591.15

T-bar = 37.27

Overall

4.34

87.03

-681.97

640.52

N = 279,884

5.53

-26.68

56.25

n = 7509

86.90

-672.92

625.19

T-bar = 37.27

7.15

-383.27

317.07

N = 279,884

2.56

-11.87

24.37

n = 7509

6.80

-371.09

299.18

T-bar = 37.27

52.75

-974.21

871.73

N = 279,884

Between

6.53

-39.79

49.16

n = 7509

Within

52.44

-958.59

862.79

T-bar = 37.27

Mean (%)

Standard deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Observations

gdpgr

1.345

0.512

-0.1

2.2

20

tb10y

4.389

0.379

3.62

5.07

20

gdpgr

0.345

1.088

-2

1.4

11

tb10y

3.535

0.409

2.74

3.88

11

gdpgr

0.98

0.551

-0.2

1.7

15

tb10y

2.374

0.545

1.64

3.46

15

Between
Within
onbalrwa

Overall

1.88

Between
Within
offbalrwa

Overall

2.92

Panel B: Macroeconomic variables
Variable
Pre-2008

Crisis Period

Post-2011

tenetintinc is net interest income; nonintinc is non-interest income; onbalrwa is risk-weighted on balance sheet
activities; offbalrwa is risk-weighted off balance sheet activities; the Mean statistic is in percentage;gdpgr is
nominal GDP growth rate; tb10y is 10-year T-bond rate

Panel D, we observe a similar pattern for the growth of off-balance-sheet activities.
Likewise, Groups 3 and 4 were hit hard by the financial crisis and their off-balancesheet activities continued to decline for a much longer period of time but thereafter
gradually climbed. This is consistent with the idea that larger banks are willing to take
steps to engage in riskier fee-based businesses as the risk-weighted off-balance-sheet
assets increase higher than the level during the period of financial crisis. It is clear that
smaller banks did not invest many of their resources in off-balance-sheet activities in the
past decade as a flat trend centered around zero is observed in the final panel.
It is interesting to note that the larger banks resumed expanding their off-balancesheet businesses after 2010 and maintained modest growth of on-balance-sheet activities when the 10-year T-bond rate continued to fall after 2010 as shown in Panel B of
Fig. 1. This preliminary result is consistent with our hypothesis that banks, especially
larger banks, are likely to invest in riskier assets when the traditional banking business
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is less able to generate satisfactory returns to stakeholders and shareholders. Table 2
shows the contemporaneous correlation among the macro-level and bank-level variables in different time periods.3 During both the period of the Great Recession and the
weak recovery, the GDP growth rate is positively related to both the 10-year T-bond
rate and all bank-level variables included in the table for the entire sample period as
shown in Panel A. The 10-year T-bond rate is positively related to all bank-level
variables. Off-balance-sheet activities are negatively associated with non-interest income and net interest income. The association between the 10-year T-bond rate and offbalance-sheet activities is significantly negative for the period of 2003q1 through 2008q1.
Although the association remains negative, it is not significant for the next two subsequent
periods. Interestingly, bank-level variables are all negatively associated with the 10year T-bond rate in the post-crisis period (i.e. 2011q1-2014q3). One thing worth noting
is that off-balance-sheet activities are negatively related to income statement items such as
non-interest income and net interest income for the last two sub-periods as shown in the
table and this relationship is significant for the post-crisis period.
2.2 Model specification
The main focus of our research lies in the relationship between low interest rates and
bank risk-taking behavior while controlling for other bank-level factors. Therefore, we
start with an analysis of risk-weighted on- and off-balance-sheet items.
Banks reveal their level of aggressiveness by making profitable loans or investing in
riskier portfolio assets and by taking on more contingent liabilities that are recorded as
risk-adjusted on-balance-sheet and risk-adjusted off-balance-sheets items, respectively.
In general, banks have more rate-sensitive assets than rate-sensitive liabilities, which
will result in positive GAP.4 When interest rates decline significantly for a long period
of time, banks with positive GAP are likely to see lower net interest income, which
might be one trigger for banks to engage in more fee-based activities. Therefore, we
include both the growth rate of net interest income and the growth rate of non-interest
income in our model as endogenous variables.
In this section, we address concerns about the presence of unit roots in the variables
by conducting a Fisher-type unit root test for panel data that calculates augmented
Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron statistics. Results in Panel A of Table 3 for the null
hypothesis that a unit root is present in all panel data is rejected, except for the 10year T-Bond rate. This result is not surprising as Panel B of Fig. 1 may indicate multiple
structural breaks for the 10-year T-bond rate during the sample period. Therefore, we
conduct a unit root test with multiple structural breaks developed by Clemente et al.
(1998) for the 10-year T-bond rate.5 Panel B of Table 3 indicates that the existence of a
unit root in the 10-year T-bond rate series is rejected at the 10 % significant level and
3

One anonymous reviewer noted that the correlation between interest income and non-interest income is
higher than 0.9, as shown in Table 2. We acknowledge the issue and explore the relationship between
contemporaneous value of one variables against a one-period lag of the other variable. The result which is
not presented in Table 2 suggests a weaker correlation, close to −.35. Therefore, collinearity issue is unlikely to
be significant.
4
The difference between rate-sensitive assets and rate-sensitive liabilities.
5
We also perform a Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root test and the result only suggests one structural break at
2006q1, which does not fit the pattern of 10-year T-Bond rate shown in Panel B of Figure 1.
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Table 2 Correlation coefficient among variables included in the GMM and Panel VAR model
2003q1-2014q3

gdpgr

tb10y

tenetintinc

nonintinc

onbalrwa

offbalrwa

gdpgr

1

tb10y

0.261*

tenetintinc

0.167*

0.040*

1

nonintinc

0.155*

0.031*

0.940*

onbalrwa

0.040*

0.113*

0.116*

0.112*

1

offbalrwa

0.027*

0.026*

-0.008*

-0.005*

0.087*

1

Pre-2008

gdpgr

tb10y

tenetintinc

nonintinc

onbalrwa

offbalrwa

gdpgr

1

tb10y

0.057*

tenetintinc

0.032*

0.231*

1

nonintinc

0.014*

0.221*

0.965*

1

onbalrwa

-0.007*

0.015*

0.105*

0.102*

offbalrwa

0.021*

-0.008*

0.004

0.006*

0.098*

1

Crisis Period

gdpgr

tb10y

tenetintinc

nonintinc

onbalrwa

offbalrwa

gdpgr

1

tb10y

0.257*

tenetintinc

0.262*

0.244*

1

nonintinc

0.238*

0.206*

0.913*

1

onbalrwa

-0.048*

0.064*

0.125*

0.123*

offbalrwa

0.002

-0.002

-0.004

-0.000

0.076*

1

Post-2011

Gdpgr

tb10y

tenetintinc

nonintinc

onbalrwa

offbalrwa

1
1

1

1

1

1

gdpgr

1

tb10y

-0.050*

1

tenetintinc

0.545*

-0.174*

1

nonintinc

0.518*

-0.179*

0.922*

1

onbalrwa

0.059*

-0.031*

0.145*

0.136*

1

offbalrwa

-0.014*

-0.002

-0.024*

-0.020*

0.058*

1

gdpgr is quarterly growth rate in GDP; tb10y is 10-year T-bond rate; tenetintinc is net interest income in logdifference form; nonintinc is non interest income in log-difference form; onbalrwa is risk-weighted on balance
sheet activities in log-difference form; offbalrwa is risk-weighted off balance sheet activities in log-difference
form (*indicates 5 % significance level)

that 2008q1 and 2010q4 are the two significant breaks on the 10-year T-bond rate. With
this result in mind, we create two dummy variables to account for the effect of structural
breaks in the interest rate data.
We employ the Arellano and Bond (1991) linear dynamic panel data model based on
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation to analyze bank risk-taking behavior in response to a lower interest rate.6 There are some benefits to use this model.
First of all, this model allows us to consider relevant endogenous variables along with
6
Arellano and Bover (1995) also discussed dynamic panel data models concerning the use of predetermined
instrumental variables.
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Table 3 Unit root tests
Panel A: Fisher unit root test for panel data
Variables

Augmented Dickey-Fuller

tenetintinc
nonintinc
gdpgr

Phillips-Perron Test

Level

325,000***

250,000***

Difference

358,000***

448,000***

Level

250,000***

211,000***

Difference

340,000***

437,000***

Level

-2.766*

Difference
onbalrwa
offbalrwa
tb10y

Level

19,600***

28,000***

Difference

112,000***

214,000***

Level

28,600***

36,800***

Difference

165,000***

310,000***

Level

-1.003

Difference

-3.136*

Panel B: Unit root test with structural breaks for 10-year T-Bond rate
T = 37

optimal breakpoints: 2008q1 , 2010q4

AR(1)

du1

du2

(rho-1)

constant

Coefficients:

-1.0139

-0.9840

0.3300

4.3667

t-statistics:

-6.168***

-5.688***

-5.49*

tenetintinc is net interest income; nonintinc is non-interest income; onbalrwa is risk-weighted on balance sheet
activities; offbalrwa is risk-weighted off balance sheet activities; gdpgr is quarterly growth rate in GDP; tb10y
is 10-year T-bond rate. Values in the table inciate Chi-square statistic. *,** and *** indicate significant at
10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance level, respectively

predetermined variables together. Second, we are able to alleviate the serial correlation
caused by endogenous variables other than dependent variable by using those endogenous variables and their own lags as instrumental variables in the model. This model
also allows us to control for the time effect. Lastly, we include two macro-level factors,
the U.S. GDP growth rate and the interest rate on 10-year U.S. Treasury Bonds, to
reflect the impact of the general economic conditions on bank management and
performance. We also include banks’ log-transformed total asset and return on assets
as control variables for bank-level characteristics (Athanasoglou et al. (2008);
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008); Laeven and Levine (2009)).
Dynamic panel data is presented by Equation (2.1).

ð2:1Þ offbalrwai;t ¼
þ

N
P
X
X

N
P
X
X
i¼1 p¼1

β 4;p nonintinci;t−p þ

i¼1 p¼0
P

þ

X
p¼0

β 1;p offbalrwai;t−p þ

β 8;p gdpgrt−p þ

þβ 14 post2011 þ εi;t :

P
X
p¼0

P
X
p¼0

N
P
X
X
i¼1 p¼0
P

β 5;p tb10yt−p þ

X

N
P
X
X

X
p¼0

β 3;p netintinci;t−p

i¼1 p¼0
P

β 6;p tb10yt−p *post2008 þ

p¼0
P

β 9;p gdpgrt−p *post2008 þ

β 2;p onbalrwai;t−p þ

X
p¼0

β 7;p tb10yt−p *post2011

β 10;p gdpgrt−p *post2011þβ 11 sizei;t þ β 12 roai;t þ β 13 post2008
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where offbalrwa is risk-weighted off-balance-sheet activities; onbalrwa is risk-weighted
on-balance-sheet activities; netintinc is net interest income; nonintinc is non-interest
income; tb10y is the 10-year T-bond rate; post2008 takes a value of 1 if time is 2008q2
to 2010q4, otherwise 0; post2011 takes a value of 1 if time is 2011q1 or after, otherwise
0; gdpgr is the GDP growth rate; size is the log-transformed total assets; roa is return on
assets; i = 1, 2,...., N representing number of banks; p is the number of lags used for
endogenous and exogenous variables, P is the maximum number of lags; and εi , t is the
error term.
We then run the Arellano-Bond two-step GMM estimation as shown in Equation (2.1). 7 In this dynamic model, all variables are log-transformed data except
for return on assets, the dummy variable and its interaction terms with the two
macro-level variables. Next, we use a Panel VAR methodology developed by
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1985); Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988 and referred to HENR hereafter). The major advantage of this model is to pool cross-sectional and time series
information across banks. The HENR model allows for less strict assumptions
when testing hypotheses. Without requiring all dependent variables to be time
stationary as a considerable amount of firm-level data are pooled together, it is still
possible to use standard asymptotic distribution theory to formulate valid tests for
non-stationary behavior (HENR pp3, 1988). We adopt the version of HENR model
programmed by Love and Zicchino (2006) using STATA. In our model we include
two macro-level variables and four bank-level variables.
In constructing the Panel VAR, the order of each endogenous variable in the model
is crucial to the results when testing hypotheses. Our baseline model must put the leastendogenous variables first in the sequence of variables. We consider a model with the
following order for each variable: GDP growth rate, 10-year T-Bond rate, net interest
income growth rate, non-interest income growth rate, growth rate of on-balance-sheet
activities, and growth rate of off-balance-sheet activities. Since our goal is to examine
the response of bank risk behavior based on different asset types, we place riskweighted on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet assets in the last two equations of
the Panel VAR model. It is worth noting that the results do not change materially when
we change the order of the variables in the Panel VAR model.
The Panel VAR model is presented in Equation (2.2).
ð2:2Þ

Y t ¼ At þ

P
X

BY t−p þ εt

p¼1

where A is a vector representing firm heterogeneity; Y is a vector of endogenous
variables including GDP growth rate, 10-year T-bond rate, growth rate of net interest
income, growth of non-interest income, growth rate of on-balance-sheet activities and
growth rate of off-balance-sheet activities; Yt − p is a vector of p-th lagged endogenous
variables; P is the maximum number of lags used in the model, and εis a vector of error
terms. By fitting the data to Equation (2.2), impulse response functions (IRFs) are used
to analyze the response of one variable to the shock of another variable in the model.
7

We performed two-step GMM estimations. Two-step GMM estimation fails to reject the null hypothesis of
zero serial correlation up to the fifth order, therefore up to 5 periods of lags of the dependent variable are
included in the GMM model.
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We then generate 95 % confidence interval boundaries associated with each impulse
response function to examine the impact of a positive, one standard deviation shock of
one variable to measure the dynamic response of each other variable in the system.

3 Discussion of empirical results
3.1 Arellano-bond dynamic GMM
In this section, we present the results of Equation (2.1) using Arellano-Bond dynamic
GMM estimation. Three model specifications are selected and presented in Table 4. All
bank-level variables are log-transformed in both models. The dependent variable is the
growth rate of off-balance-sheet activities. Different from the first model, the second
model includes interaction terms for two time dummy variables with the GDP growth
rate and the 10-year T-bond rate, respectively. The third model is similar to Model 2
except that the variables contained in the interaction terms are demeaned.8 We specify
that all bank-level variables, the GDP growth rate and the 10-year T-bond rate are
endogenous and interact with each other contemporaneously or subsequently.
Three (five) lags of bank-level variables are included in the first (second and
third) model(s) as the AR test associated with this model shows insignificant serial
correlation after the fifth lag of the residuals. Up to 12 (24) lags of all bank-level
variables and the two macroeconomic variables serve as instrumental variables for
the implementation of two-step estimation. The Hansen J-statistic’s p values for all
three models are each greater than 0.1, indicating these models have no significant
over-identification problem.9
All three models suggest that current off-balance-sheet activities are significantly
and negatively affected by its own innovation contemporaneously and in the most
recent three quarters. They also indicate that off-balance-sheet activities are significantly and negatively associated with current on-balance-sheet activities. The impact of
previous changes in on-balance-sheet activities on current off-balance-sheet activities is
positive and slightly significant. Model 1 shows that lags of net interest income are
negatively but not significantly associated with off balance-sheet activities. However,
the negative association between the two variables becomes stronger and significant
after considering interaction terms and the demean effects as shown in Models 2 and 3.
Surprisingly, off-balance-sheet activities appear to have a weak relationship with noninterest income contemporaneously and subsequently as shown in Model 1. After
considering structural breaks and demean effects, Models 2 and 3 show that past
non-interest income is positively associated with current off-balance-sheet items.
8

We adopted an anonymous reviewer’s suggestion to use the difference between individual observations from
its overall average for the variables contained in the interaction terms. This allows us to isolate the impact of
dummy variable (Crisis Period and Post-2011) on the key variables of 10 year Treasury rate and GDP growth
rate. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
9
We tried different model specifications by alternatively dropping either interest income or non-interest
income as one reviewer expressed concern about a high correlation between the two variables. However,
the p value of the Hansen J-statistics for these alternative models suggest dropping either variable is not
appropriate. The results from these alternative model specifications are not included herein but are available
upon request.
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Table 4 Generalized method of moments dynamic panel model
Dep. Var: D.loffbalrwa

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

loffbalrwa
LD.

-0.278(−1.96)**

-0.345(−4.85)***

-0.401(−5.48)***

L2D.

-0.452(−4.11)***

-0.213(−3.59)***

-0.239(−4.07)***

L3D.

-0.162(−1.57)

-0.130(−2.2)**

-0.124(−2.06)**

L4D.

0.495(6.56)***

0.436(9.44)***

0.449(10.29)***

L5D.

0.041(4.28)***

0.044(6.74)***

0.046(7.21)***

lonbalrwa
D1.

-1.598(−5.09)***

-1.044(−1.85)*

-1.204(−2.07)**

LD.

0.301(1.01)

0.502(1.12)

0.234(0.51)

L2D.

-0.071(−0.17)

0.942(2.78)***

0.967(2.77)***

L3D.

0.250(4.12)***

0.672(1.78)*

0.694(1.79)*

L4D.

-0.512(−1.17)

-0.102(−0.23)

L5D.

-0.011(−0.17)

0.034(0.48)

0.035(0.3)

0.057(0.33)

0.176(0.97)

LD.

0.023(0.29)

-0.152(−1.36)

-0.143(−1.27)

L2D.

-0.086(−1.18)

-0.190(−1.64)*

-0.245(−2.09)**

L3D.

-0.027(−0.56)

ltenetintinc
D1.

0.028(0.27)

0.006(0.05)

L4D.

-0.215(−1.41)

-0.328(−2.08)**

L5D.

-0.067(−1.52)

-0.102(−2.39)**

lnonintinc
D1.

-0.046(−0.41)

0.029(0.3)

0.033(0.35)

LD.

-0.042(−0.64)

0.139(1.6)

0.159(1.73)*

L2D.

0.067(1.14)

0.117(1.32)

0.163(1.76)*

L3D.

0.005(0.42)

-0.095(−1.84)*

-0.082(−1.58)

L4D.

0.065(0.95)

0.045(0.68)

L5D.

0.005(0.57)

0.004(0.44)

tb10y

-0.006(−0.59)

tb10y*post2008
tb10y*post2011

0.062(1.87)*

0.081(2.46)**

-0.118(−1.51)

-0.311(−3.01)***

-0.060(−1.53)

-0.080(−2.04)**

-0.045(−1.55)

-0.058(−1.99)**

L1.tb10y*post2008

0.010(0.13)

-0.010(−0.23)

L1.tb10y*post2011

0.064(1.83)*

0.073(2.09)**

L1.tb10y

L2.tb10y

-0.032(−3.93)***

-0.024(−2.08)**

L2.tb10y*post2008
L2.tb10y*post2011
L3.tb10y

-0.045(−4.12)***

L3.tb10y*post2008
L3.tb10y*post2011
L4tb10y

-0.006(−0.91)

0.017(0.75)

0.021(0.92)

-0.062(−0.46)

-0.143(−1.91)*

-0.030(−1.08)

-0.033(−1.16)

0.004(0.16)

0.0003(0.01)

-0.035(−0.1)

0.278(2.55)**

0.041(1.71)*

0.038(1.6)

0.030(0.84)

0.038(1.08)
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Table 4 (continued)
Dep. Var: D.loffbalrwa

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

L4.tb10y*post2008

-0.075(−0.25)

0.200(1.88)*

L4.tb10y*post2011

-0.030(−0.82)

-0.031(−0.87)

gdpgr

0.018(3.42)***

gdpgr*post2008
gdpgr*post2011
L1.gdpgr

0.023(3.2)***

0.009(1.15)

0.006(0.75)

0.013(0.14)

-0.026(−1.15)

-0.009(−0.79)

-0.007(−0.58)

0.033(1.93)*

0.029(1.67)*

L1.gdpgr*post2008

-0.021(−0.78)

0.039(1.59)

L1.gdpgr*post2011

-0.028(−1.29)

-0.029(−1.27)

0.069(1.85)*

0.076(2.06)**

L2.gdpr

0.004(0.62)

L2.gdpgr*post2008

-0.045(−1.09)

-0.015(−0.72)

L2.gdpgr*post2011

-0.074(−1.94)*

-0.086(−2.25)**

L3.gdpgr

0.020(2.36)**

0.059(1.78)*

0.066(2)**

-0.047(−0.74)

-0.062(−2.28)**

-0.051(−1.48)

-0.063(−1.83)*

0.049(2.49)**

0.057(2.93)***

L4.gdpgr*post2008

-0.019(−0.11)

-0.130(−2.19)**

L4.gdpgr*post2011

-0.033(−1.64)*

-0.044(−2.19)**

L3.gdpgr*post2008
L3.gdpgr*post2011
L4.gdpgr

0.014(3.08)***

ltotalassets

-0.219(−3.22)***

-0.148(−2.36)**

-0.135(−2.08)**

roa

-0.0256(−1.23)

-0.006(−0.37)

-0.008(−0.45)

post2008

-0.115(−3.52)***

-0.09(−0.89)

-0.362(−2.62)***

post2011

-0.076(−2.11)**

-0.017(−0.69)

-0.023(−0.95)

p value for Hansen J statistics

0.365

0.485

0.168

autocorrelation

AR(6)

AR(6)

AR(6)

Wald statistic

659.64

723.61

744.95

The dependent variable, loffbalrwa, is risk-weighted off-balace-sheet activities. Risk-weighted on-balancesheet activities (lonbalrwa), net interest income (tenetintinc) and non-interest income (nonintinc) are other
endogenous variables in the right-hand side of the model; gdpgr is the growth rate in GDP; tb10y is 10-year Tbond rate. (All the variables mentioned above are transformed by logarithm); ltotalassets is log of total assets.
Roa is return on assets. post2008 is a dummy variable, the value takes one if date is between 2008q2 and
2010q4. post2011 is a dummy variable, the value take on eif date is 2011q1 or after. (*,*** and *** indicate
significant in 10 %, 5 % and 1 % significance level). Model 1 is the baseline mode without any interaction
terms. Model 2 uses T-bond rate and GDP growth rate in the interaction terms. Model 3 uses demeaned T-bond
rate and GDP growth rate in the interaction terms. P value indicates the result of Hansen’s J-statistic test for
over-identification. Autocorrelation test indicates no serial correlation prior to the 6th lag of endogenous
variables in the models. Wald statistic denotes the goodness of fit of the regressions

Taken as a whole, these results indicate that higher on-balance-sheet activities and
higher income statement items in the past quarters trigger banks to engage in more offbalance-sheet business, whereas higher off-balance-sheet activities in the previous
quarters put a brake on bank acquisition of off-balance-sheet assets. These results show
that banks try to strike a balance between revenue creation and risk control. All three
models indicate that a lower current return on assets has no impact on off-balance-sheet
activities as is presented in Table 4. Surprisingly, the negative and significant
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coefficient for the size effect as measured by total assets indicates that the rate at which
larger banks grow their off-balance-sheet activities is not as high as those smaller banks
over the period from 2003 to 14.
We then turn to the relationship between off-balance-sheet activities and the
macro-level variables. Model 1 does not include interaction terms, while Models
2 and 3 separates the entire sample into (pre-crisis) stable and high interest rate,
(crisis) declining interest rate, and (post-crisis) stable and low interest rate time
periods. In the models, we use 2008q1 and 2010q4 as two break points. This
results from a Clemente et al. (1998) test for structural breaks. Model 1 presents
an insignificant and negative contemporary relationship between the 10-year Tbond rate and off-balance-sheet activities while the first three lags of the T-bond
rate are negatively related to off-balance-sheet activities and this negative association fades away after the third lag. This finding supports the hypothesis that
banks grow off-balance-sheet activities in periods when interest rates are relatively lower.
Models 2 considers interaction terms between non-demeaned macro-level factors
and the two dummy variables. The association between off-balance-sheet activities and
the rest of the bank-level variables do not change materially even after time-dummies
and their interaction terms with macroeconomic variables are added to the model.10 As
for the relationship between off-balance-sheet activities and the 10-year T-bond rate, the
empirical results show that off-balance-sheet activities respond positively and contemporaneously to a falling interest rate before 2008. After 2008q2, off-balance-sheet
activities decrease but not significantly along with a declining interest rate. When using
demeaned macro-variable in the interaction terms, Model 3 shows a much stronger and
significant association between off-balance-sheet item and the interest rate, suggesting
that banks aggressively engage in off-balance-sheet activities during and beyond the
period of financial crisis.
We then ask whether banks are likely to respond to interest rate changes
subsequently. To answer this question, we examine the relationship between
current off-balance-sheet activities and lagged T-bond rate for the three periods.
Model 2 shows current off-balance-sheet items is not significantly impacted by
lagged T-bond rate for all periods except the first and third lags during post-2011
era. Model 3 reinforces the results of Model 2 with even stronger significance
for the impact of the lagged T-bond rate on current off-balance-sheet items
during all three periods. In summary, Model 3 presents a Bnegative and then
positive^ dynamic relationship between current off-balance-sheet activities and
lagged T-bond rate for the periods of the financial crisis and post-2011 except
this Bnegative and then positive^ pattern continues much longer for the financial
crisis period.
As the findings of GMM models suggests a significant impact of a one period lag
change in the interest rate on the contemporaneous movement of the off-balance-sheet
variable, it is now appropriate to examine how an interest rate shock affects bank risk10

We also included an interaction term of lagged off-balance-sheet item and time dummy variables, as one
reviewer’s suggestion based on Balli and Sorensen (2013) that we should consider the impact of regulatory
change during the financial crisis period on some off-balance-sheet activities. The results of these additions are
not materially different from those presented in Table 4.
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taking behavior over time. In the next section, we focus on the impact of a one standard
deviation shock to the 10-year T-bond rate on the bank-level variables included in the
GMM model above.
3.2 Panel VAR model
In this section, we present the empirical results of equation (2.2) built on the framework
developed by Love and Zicchino (2006). The main interest of our framework is to
examine how a shock to the interest rate affects bank-level variables. Our Panel VAR
model allows all variables in the system to interact with each other. We start out with
our baseline VAR model by placing the variables in the following order: GDP growth
rate, 10-year T-bond rate, net interest income, non-interest income, on-balance-sheet
activities, and off-balance-sheet activities.11 This ordering is in line with the principle of
constructing a VAR model by the degree of endogeneity of each variable, in order of
least to most.
We run Equation (2.2) for the entire time period as well as for the three sub-periods
separated by the time points of 2008q1 and 2010q4. 12 Most of the coefficients are
significant. We pay particular attention to the association between off-balance-sheet
activities and the 10-year T-bond rate. The overall results are consistent with Equation
(2.1) in many ways. First, off-balance-sheet activities positively associate with lagged
GDP growth rate for all periods, indicating that strong economic growth triggers banks
to take on more risky assets regardless of the time period analyzed. Second, offbalance-sheet activities are positively related to lagged on-balance-sheet activities for
all periods. Off-balance-sheet activities are not strongly related to lagged non-interest
income and lagged net interest income throughout the whole time period.
Since the main interest of this Panel VAR model is to analyze how the shock to the
interest rate transmits throughout the whole system and how it affects off-balance-sheet
activities, we analyze the impulse response functions up to fifth period among six
variables. Figure 2 presents the graphs of impulse response functions for the response
of on-balance-sheet activities to the shock of the 10-year T-bond rate as well as for offbalance-sheet activities.
Panel A.1 of Fig. 2 shows that a shock to the 10-year T-bond rate has a contemporaneous and negative effect to off-balance-sheet activities prior to 2008q1, however, the
impact turns and remains positive for over 24 periods. Next, Panel A.2 of Fig. 2 shows
a positive but not significant response to the shock occurred in the contemporaneous
period and turns negative in the following period and then dies out for the rest of the
periods, indicating that an interest rate shock was likely to have temporary and negative
impact on off-balance-sheet activities during the Crisis Period. Panel A.3 displays a
similar pattern as Panel A.2 except that there is positive and significant effect in the
initial period and the impact turns negative in Period 2 then changes to positive value
and stays in the positive territory over 24 periods. Panel A.4 presents a positive
response of off-balance-sheet activities to the interest rate shock for the entire sample
11

We change the order of the variables included in the system and find the results do not change materially.
Results are available upon request.
12
Due to space limitations, we do not include the results of the 6-variable Panel VAR model and impulse
response functions. Regression results are available upon request.
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Fig. 2 Impulse response functions for the 6-variable Panel VAR model. Panel VAR model using Love’s
structural VAR model. This model contains six variables. The first two variables are macroeconomic variables
including GDP growth rate and 10-year T-bond rate. The last four are bank-level variables including net
interest income, non-interest income, on-balance-sheet items and off-balance-sheet items. We run the model
for the entire sample and then break down the time period into three sub-periods according to Clemente et al.
(1998) unit root test with two structural breaks. The first break point is 2008q1 and the second one is 2010q4.
We then focus on the response of off-balance-sheet activities and on-balance-sheet activities to the shock of
10-year T-bond rate. The confidence bands of the impulse response functions are formed at 95 % confidence
level. (The results do not change fundamentally when we change the order of variables in the model). Panel A:
Response of off-balance-sheet activities to the shock of 10-year T-bond rate during different time period. Panel
B: Response of on-balance-sheet activities to the shock of 10-year T-bond rate during different time period.
Panel C: Response of off-balance-sheet activities to the shock of 10-year T-bond rate prior to 2008q1 for
different group size. Panel D: Response of off-balance-sheet activities to the shock of 10-year T-bond rate
between 2008q2 and 2010q4 in different group size. Panel E: Response of off-balance-sheet activities to the
shock of 10-year T-bond rate after 2011q4 in different group size.

period that is similar to that of Panels A.2 and A.3, suggesting the impact from Crisis
Period and Post-2011 is dominant over the entire period.
We also examine whether bank size matters with respect to a change in bank risk. In
general, we find that patterns for Groups 1 and 2 are similar in that their off-balancesheet activities respond positively to an interest rate shock, whereas the response for
Groups 3 and 4 are negative but not significant throughout the entire time period.
Because of these inconsistent results,13 we break down the groups based on bank
size and time horizon. Panel C of Fig. 2 displays impulse response functions of all
groups for the time period prior to 2008q2. Group 1 as shown in Panel C.1 had a
negative response of off-balance-sheet activities to a one standard deviation interest rate
shock, however, the impact quickly turns positive in the second period and remains
positive afterwards. Although Group 2 shown in Panel C.2 did not have a significant
response to the interest rate shock in the first place, the response becomes positive and
long-lasting. Off-balance-sheet activities of Group 3, shown in Panel C.3, responds
negatively to the interest rate shock contemporaneously but the impact approaches zero
afterwards. Panel C.4 indicates that the interest rate shock did not affect mega-banks’
off-balance-sheet activities before the Financial Crisis of 2008.
Panel D presents the impulse response functions of off-balance-sheet activities
to an interest rate shock for all groups between 2008q2 and 2010q4. This time
period was the darkest period of recent financial industry history as numerous
financial scandals started to unfold and several Too-Big-To-Fail financial institutions desperately required government bailouts. At the same time, developed
countries experienced one of the worst recessions since WWII. The list of bank
bankruptcies continued to grow and news reports of bank earnings falling short
of expectations were constant. Return on Assets as shown in Panel E of Fig. 1
also shows banks of all size experienced negative returns during this period. The
Federal Reserve Bank’s FOMC, taking into account of all measures, decided to
use unusual financial facilities to bring down both long-term and short-term
interest rates to a very low level. With this history in mind, we find that Panel
D of Fig. 2 describes a very interesting picture for banks of different size during
13

Those results are not presented here but are available upon request.
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this period of time. Panels D.1 and D.2 suggest that Groups 1 and 2 had similar
positive but insignificant responses to a falling interest rate contemporaneously
but the impact of the shock has different results in the two groups after the initial
period. Banks in Group 2 increased their risky off-balance-sheet assets in the
subsequent periods in response to a declining interest rate. Banks in Group 3
show a negative but insignificant response to the lower interest rate in the initial
period, however the response is similar to that of Group 2 as shown in Panel
D.3. Panel D.4 shows that the response of the largest banks in Group 4 is
negative contemporaneously but then stays close to zero after the initial period.
In summary, the larger banks, excluding Group 1, respond negatively to a falling
interest rate and the negative response remained persistent and significant after
the first period.
Finally, we present the impulse response functions for off-balance-sheet activities to
a one standard deviation interest rate shock for all groups for the period after 2010q4 in
Panel E. We find that the patterns of responses are very similar to those of the pre-2008
period in the subsequent periods except that the impact stays above zero in the later
periods. The impact is positive and long-lasting except for smallest banks. In conclusion, the Panel VAR model suggests that the impact of an interest rate shock on off-
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balance-sheet activities is positive prior to 2008 and post 2011 but negative for the
period between 2008 and 2011.
We next turn our attention to the impact of interest rate shock on-balance-sheet
activities. Panel B displays a positive impulse response functions for on-balance-sheet
activities to a one standard deviation interest rate shock throughout the entire period
and all three sub-periods. Comparing Panel B with Panel A, we find that the response
of on-balance-sheet activities to an interest rate shock is notably different from that of
off-balance-sheet activities over the same time horizon, indicating that a change in
interest rates has different policy implications for both on-balance-sheet and offbalance-sheet transactions. When the interest rate level is relatively higher, banks tend
to pursue more on-balance-sheet activities and couple that with gradual growth in offbalance-sheet business. On the other hand when the interest rate falls continuously
leading to an era of low interest rates and slow economic growth, banks slowly realize
that on-balance-sheet activities become less profitable and take on more off-balancesheet business that generates fee-based revenues.

4 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether bank risk-taking behavior changes during a period of
falling interest rates and weak economic conditions. Using both on-balance-sheet
activities and off-balance-sheet activities as measures for bank risk, we hypothesize
that banks are likely to engage in more risky off-balance-sheet activities, i.e. fee-based
business, when on-balance-sheet assets, i.e. interest-bearing accounts, become less
profitable due to lower interest rates. We employed a dynamic GMM model for panel
data and a Panel VAR model to test these hypotheses.
The results of a dynamic GMM model for panel data indicate that off-balance-sheet
activities after 2008q1 are negatively related to contemporaneous and one-lag interest
rates while controlling for the GDP growth rate, other bank level variables, two dummy
variables and interaction terms of dummy variables with the 10-year T-bond rate and
GDP growth rate, respectively. These results support our hypothesis that banks might
increase the amount of higher risk assets in the subsequent quarter in anticipation of
higher expected return associated with them during the low interest rate era. Although
different dependent variables are used as a proxy for risk taking behavior in Delis and
Kouretas (2011), their results indicate that lower interest rates (short term/bank lending
rates) lead to higher ratio of risky assets relative to total bank asset holdings. Our
empirical results also suggest the same conclusion using a more extended time period
that includes a time of financial crisis in the history of banking and its aftermath.
To examine how an interest rate shock affects bank risk, we conduct a parsimonious Panel VAR analysis including the GDP growth rate, the 10-year T-bond rate,
and four bank-level variables. Our empirical results indicate that an interest rate
shock to the Panel VAR system causes off-balance-sheet activities of larger banks to
decrease contemporaneously and then increase subsequently for the period of 2008
through 2010. However, no such pattern is observed for smaller banks during the
same period. This is an interesting finding and future research should explore factors
that determine risk-taking behavior for banks of different size during such exceptionally difficult economic conditions.
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Our research sheds light on banking regulations regarding bank risk management
during a time of financial turmoil. The possibility that larger banks tend to invest in
riskier off-balance sheet assets to boost earnings should alarm lawmakers as Too-BigTo-Fail banks could undermine economic welfare if they are not able to remain
financially and managerially sound. Therefore, an implication for policy makers is
the need to impose a more restrictive capital ratio on larger bank. On the other hand,
smaller banks do not engage in more off-balance-sheet activities during a period of
stable low interest rates. Therefore imposing a higher capital ratio standard on smaller
banks might have a detrimental effect on profitability and sustainability without
corresponding benefits in reducing bank risk.
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